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Abstract 
 
So far, the estimation of discount rates required by entrepreneurs has remained a mystery. 
Mongrut and Ramirez (2006) made a contribution to this area by deriving the lower bound 
discount rate for a non-diversified entrepreneur in an emerging market. However, they used a 
quadratic utility function, which does not have desirable assumptions. In this research one 
extends the previous work by deriving expressions of discount rates using a Hyperbolic 
Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility function that includes the quadratic and the 
logarithmic forms as special cases. Furthermore, one also assumes the entrepreneur with the 
lowest risk-aversion that invests almost all his capital in his project or firm and whose level of 
wealth approaches to zero. One finds that both expressions depend upon entrepreneur’s risk-
aversion and a measure of the project total risk. Maintaining constant the risk-free rate, we 
simulate the expressions of discount rate for the quadratic form and the logarithmic form. As 
expected, the entrepreneur’s required returns (discount rates) are highly sensitive in both 
specifications and all values were lower than 50% and most of them were lower than 25%, but 
higher than the assumed risk-free rate. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a pioneering work, McInish and Kudla (1981) argued that the so called two-fund 
separation theorem, originally developed by Tobin (1958), does not hold in the case of closely-
held firms and small firms. Hence, the appropriate discount rate for valuating these firms would 
be required rates of return from the owners of the business instead of a market discount rate. 
 
The two-fund separation theorem states that the optimal portfolio of risky securities is 
exactly the same regardless of the investors’ risk preferences1. This property is extremely 
important for asset pricing because it allows us to estimate the cost of equity capital under 
equilibrium conditions, such as in the case of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Recently, Breuer and Gürtler (2007) have shown that in order to meet the two-fund separation 
theorem two restricted conditions must be met: the utility function must be always defined and 
marginal utility must be positive. Unfortunately, these well-defined problems restrict seriously 
the application of the two-fund separation theorem.   
 
This problem is even worse given the fact that not all preferences can be represented 
with utility functions. This is the main argument that Meyer (2007) advocates to favor marginal 
utility function instead of the utility function itself because the former encompasses a bigger 
possible set of risk preferences. 
 
Another avenue that the literature has pursued is to impose certain restrictions to the 
distribution of stock returns in order to attain the two-fund separation theorem. Ross (1978) 
has shown the conditions that must be fulfilled to apply the theorem   independently of the 
investor utility function. Wei et.al (1999) have shown that, although general elliptical 
distributions can guarantee the two-fund separation property, the identification of the “true” 
return distribution is rather difficult, not to say impossible. It is clear by now that using 
distribution properties of stock returns, is not a good avenue to guarantee the two-fund 
separation theorem. Furthermore, to follow the specification of utility functions that belong to 
the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) family, only guarantee this separation 
property under restricted conditions.  
 
The previous discussion is important if one is interested in obtaining the market value 
of an investment project. If this is not the case, the argument related to the distribution of stock 
returns    becomes irrelevant as the capital market is not going to be a benchmark and the 
argument related to risk preference (utility function and marginal utility) becomes more 
relevant because it is the only way to specify the risk preferences and discount rates for seed 
capital projects and firms. 
 
Unfortunately, there is a cost of using subjective discount rates because the estimated 
Net Present Value (NPV) turns out to be just one profitability indicator instead of being a 
normative investment rule (Zurita, 2005). In other words, two entrepreneurs could assess 
differently the same investment project being both estimations valid. This is not possible under 
market-derived conditions such as the ones imposed by the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). 
 
 
                                                          
1   Cas and Stiglitz (1970) managed to show the conditions under which the two-fund separation theorem 
can be applied under hyperbolic preferences.  
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Another problem related with the estimation of subjective discount rates is the possible 
bias in the estimation of the parameters. These different biases have been explained by 
Fuenzalida et al. (2007), so one must use a heuristic procedure in order to avoid as much as 
possible the potential biases. 
 
Despite these disadvantages, it is convenient to derive formulas for the project’s 
discount rates under certain assumptions because these will provide magnitudes of how much 
we could gain or we could lose with the project in different scenarios through a prospective 
analysis for valuating the project. In this prospective analysis what matters are the foreseen 
contingent strategies for increasing the likelihood of success of the project rather than using 
just one indicator (i.e. NPV) to accept or reject the investment proposal. 
 
In fact, Mongrut and Ramirez (2006) estimated a formula for project discount rate for 
investors with quadratic preferences in an incomplete market. They concluded that, for 
entrepreneurs with the lower risk aversion, the discount rate was not unique in an incomplete 
market. Even more, the discount rate is bounded from below and we can only estimate the 
maximum value for the investment project, but not its minimum value. In this situation the 
discount rate will depend upon three parameters: the risk-free rate, the reward-to-variability 
ratio (RTV) of the project, and the project total risk. 
 
Mongrut (2015) expanded the risk analysis process proposed by Fuenzalida et al. (2007) 
to estimate the project’s total risk. This expanded process includes a previous prospective 
analysis, so the project’s NPV will be estimated for different scenarios and where the 
entrepreneurs' risk-aversion coefficient could change. In this way, one may estimate project’s 
NPV using the estimated total risk for each year of the time-horizon with different discount 
rates and within each scenario.   
 
Although the discount rate expression provided by Mongrut and Ramirez (2006) is 
simple, contains unrealistic assumptions because they used a quadratic utility function that 
implies a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and it is well-known that this utility function 
is not increasing everywhere2. The main goal of this research is to derive discount rates using 
risk-preferences according to HARA utility functions. It turns out to be that discount rate 
expressions depend upon a measure of the project’s total risk and the entrepreneurs' risk 
aversion coefficient. 
 
The paper is organized as follows, the next section defines the concept of a discount 
rate according to the features of seed capital investments, then in the third section one explains 
briefly all the new set of utility functions available and justifies the use of the HARA family. 
In the fourth section one derives an expression for the discount rate using the HARA family 
and assuming incomplete markets. In the fifth section, with the aid of simulation, one explores 
the properties of the discount rate expressions. In the last section one concludes the work. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2  The traditional assumptions related to utility functions are: the utility function is an increasing function 
everywhere of consumption or wealth (meaning that more is better), the utility function is concave and 
twice differentiable, where the first derivative is positive (marginal utility) and the second is negative 
(Gerber and Pafumi, 1999). 
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2. Definition of a discount rate in the context of seed capital investments 
 
In the context of seed capital investments, the discount rate is the return that 
entrepreneur would require from his investment project.  In this section one not only defines 
the discount rate, but also, one discusses the different features that a utility function must have 
in order to be applied in the context of seed capital investments. 
 
 Time preferences, time value of money and risk 
 
There are two parallel strands of literature related to the estimation of the discount rate: 
the social choice literature and private choice literature. Although, in both cases, the discount 
rate is being used to discount future net benefits, what it represents is quite different. 
 
In terms of the social choice literature what matters is the time preference problem that 
is the trade-off between present consumption and future consumption. Given that this trade-off 
is done on an individual basis, then one needs to aggregate these individual benefits into a 
measure of social benefit (Cameron and Gerdes, 2003). Hence, much of the literature has been 
devoted to estimate individual discount rates using exponential or hyperbolic utility functions, 
and surveys and simulations to validate them. 
 
The main conclusion so far is that individuals’ opinions about social discount rates vary 
substantially across samples depending on the context for making a choice and the techniques 
used to elicit opinions. The main problem is that most individuals do not know the meaning of 
a discount rate and if they know it, nothing guarantees that they are being able to exteriorize 
the magnitude of their individual discount rate. Hence, according to the social choice literature, 
there is an urgent need to gather only experts’ opinions and to translate the language of a 
discount rate into its constituents that, hopefully, are more familiar to experts rather than non-
experts. 
 
In the case of the private choice literature, one is faced with only one choice: to invest 
or not to invest in a certain investment project. However, there is also the problem of social 
aggregation that needs to be solved. The discount rate in this context is understood as an 
opportunity cost that considers not only the time value of money, but that it also includes the 
risk to which the investor is facing. In other words, it is an opportunity cost commensurate to 
the project’s risk level. 
 
Here, there are two common interpretations that lead to market discount rates or to 
subjective discount rates. In the former case, it is being assumed that each investor holds a 
well-diversified portfolio of investments; hence he only needs to worry about the project’s 
market risk, which is the project’s contribution to the risk of this well-diversified portfolio. In 
the latter case, one assumes that investors do not hold a portfolio of investment projects and in 
this way they are completely exposed to the project’s total risk. Naturally, these are two 
extremes assumptions within a range of possible degrees of diversification, but they are quite 
convenient because these assumptions let us to work with more tractable models. 
 
The aggregation problem in the case of market discount rates is solved by using the 
two-fund separation theorem. Specifically, one postulates the existence of an investor who hold 
a well-diversified investment portfolio (market portfolio) that represents all individual 
investors in the market, so each one of the assets is priced according to its market risk. Finally, 
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by using the market discount rate one is estimating the value of the investment project from the 
market’s point of view (the representative investor).  
 
In the case of individually-based discount rates the aggregation problem is of a different 
nature. Here we need a consensus forecast of the experts’ opinion related to the critical 
variables of a single investment project. However, nothing guarantees that this consensus 
forecast is valid for the market as a whole. In fact, it is only helpful to a single investment 
project. 
 
Hence, according to these two extreme points of view, the market risk is the relevant 
one for well-diversified investors and the total risk is the relevant one for non-diversified 
investors that are usually the owners of seed capital projects and firms (Erikson, 2005). Hence, 
it is of paramount importance the proper estimation of both risks.   
 
 The utility function for seed capital investments 
 
In a seminal work, McMahon and Stanger (1995) discussed different factors that affect 
small firms’ objective function. They argued that the owner-manager’s utility function depends 
upon pecuniary returns from the business (P) (i.e. return on investment - ROI); non-pecuniary 
satisfactions from the business that are in the financial domain (Nf) (i.e. a good financial health, 
operative flexibility, and so on); non-pecuniary satisfactions from the business that are outside 
the financial domain (Nn) (i.e. preferred lifestyle, self-esteem, and so on); and total risk, which 
is the sum of systematic or market risk and the unsystematic or specific risk ( ). Hence, the 
utility function for a small firm’s owner-manager will be as follows: 
 
   ,N,NP,UwU nf          (1) 
 
In this specification, the owner-manager’s wealth is affected by all the factors already 
described. Furthermore, these authors went further explaining why the firms’ return, firm’s 
risk, firm’s liquidity, the degree of diversification of the owners-managers, the transferability 
of financial and human capital, the financial flexibility and the desire to control the firm would 
impact this utility function through their different variables. 
 
Although this utility function seems plausible as a generalization for small firms, there 
are two remarks: there are many types of small firms and hence some of them are going to be 
less affected by some factors, and most of these factors influence also the utility function of a 
corporate firm. The point here is not the difference between firms' sizes, but the different 
relative impact of each of these factors in the entrepreneur's utility function.  
 
For instance, the possibility to transfer financial and human capital from one generation 
to the other is important for certain types of small firms such as family firms. In this case, the 
founder derives part of his satisfaction by looking at how his heirs take the business properly. 
However, for the owner-manager of a new venture it is more important to have financial 
flexibility because he needs funds, which are usually not provided by venture capitalists in the 
early stage of the business. In other words, he must be able to show to potential creditors or 
shareholders that he is able to cope with different scenarios using contingent strategies. 
 
Other factors, such the firm’s return, liquidity, desire of control and accountability are 
also important for corporate firms. In fact, there is no way in which a company can survive in 
the long-term if it does not have liquidity and if it does not care for the firm’s stakeholders. Of 
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course, here one must recognize that liquidity could be a matter of life and death for a small 
firm, but not necessarily for a corporate firm.   
 
The degree of diversification of the owner-manager and the firm’s risk are crucial 
because they change the valuation tools for small firms and in particular for seed capital 
investments. A seed capital project is usually run by a single non-diversified entrepreneur that 
faces the project’s total risk. A market valuation does not apply here because there is no a 
representative investor, only matter the entrepreneur and the experts’ opinions concerning a 
particular investment proposal. Besides, given that the entrepreneur puts all his money in the 
project or firm then he will face the project’s total risk. Furthermore, in this case the traditional 
value-additivity principle breaks up, because the entrepreneur could derive some positive 
synergies by investing in different projects3. 
 
Another issue worth to discuss is whether to include or not in the utility function the 
non-pecuniary satisfactions that do not lie within the financial domain (Nn). Although it is 
important to have a preferred lifestyle, security by being self-employed, employment to family 
members, and self-esteem; one must recognize that most of these satisfactions do not apply for 
all small firms and some of them are beyond the firm’s fate, so it is debatable whether to include 
them or not in the entrepreneur’s utility function.   
 
For instance, having a good self-esteem is a personal attribute that a person must 
cultivate regardless whether he becomes an entrepreneur or not. Of course, if he is interested 
to become an entrepreneur, as a preferred lifestyle, he will get an important satisfaction by 
being an entrepreneur independently if his business becomes successful or not. 
 
In other words, if self-esteem and become an entrepreneur by conviction are two 
attributes beyond the firm’s fate, is it important to value the marginal satisfaction that the 
entrepreneur may obtain through his entrepreneurial adventure? Due to the fact that the 
entrepreneur will obtain satisfaction anyway by running his business, one may think about 
these non-pecuniary satisfactions as belonging to a superior indifference curve, but all with the 
same slope. In other words, it is like having a constant that moves the utility function upward, 
but these non-pecuniary satisfactions do not restrict the shape and the optimum solution.  Hence 
one may decide not to include this constant in the entrepreneur’s utility function4.  
 
Concerning the non-pecuniary satisfactions related to the financial domain (Nf), they 
could be included through different scenarios as contingent strategies that improve the project 
financial health and its likelihood of success. Of course one must also include them in the 
entrepreneur’s utility function and obtain a discount rate accordingly, but one may also include 
them through a prospective analysis of the project5.     
 
                                                          
3  The value-additivity principle states that the value of a firm, for a well-diversified investor, is equal to 
the value of the firm without the project plus the NPV of the project. This is possible because only matters 
the firm’s contribution to the well-diversified investor’s portfolio, so any potential synergy between the 
project and the firm does not have a market value because the investor could diversify better and quicker 
than the firm. In the case of a non-diversified entrepreneur, this principle breaks-up.   
4  This decision amounts to picture a self-confident entrepreneur who decided to be an entrepreneur by 
conviction and who runs his business in a strictly professional way.. 
5  For example, James (1999) has included the transferability issue into the owner-manager’s utility 
function of a family firm.   
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In brief, one believes that the utility function for entrepreneurs who are facing a seed 
capital investment may be a subset of the utility function described by McMahon and Stanger 
(1995): 
 
    P,UwU            (2) 
 
Note that “P” is related to pecuniary returns from the business, especially the return on 
investment (ROI) that helps to provide a good salary for owner-manager. Given that most 
entrepreneurs with seed capital investment opportunities are not diversified, the second 
parameter ( ) is related to the project's total risk. The non-pecuniary satisfaction related to the 
financial domain (Nf) are addressed directly in the prospective analysis and the pecuniary 
satisfactions outside of the financial domain (Nn) are not considered in the entrepreneur or 
owner-manager’s utility function. 
 
3. The choice of the utility function for discount rates 
 
The field of risk preferences (utility functions) was fostered by the work of Arrow 
(1965, 1971) and Pratt (1964). In particular, they both proposed the following specification of 
utility functions6: 
 
  tCt eCU

           (3) 
 
This function is well-known as the negative exponential and it has a constant absolute 
risk-aversion coefficient (   tcA  ). They also proposed the following specification7: 
 
 





1
1
t
t
C
CU           (4) 
 
This utility function is known as the power utility function where the parameter ( ) 
represents the level of relative risk-aversion. Unfortunately, both specifications only let us vary 
the magnitude of the risk-aversion (absolute or relative), but they do not allow us to change the 
slope of these risk-aversion measures (Meyer, 2007). 
 
   
The slope represent the behaviour of the individual’s risk- aversion because it may 
depict decreasing (or increase) of the absolute risk-aversion (DARA or IARA) .In one hand, a 
DARA behaviour implies that richer people are less risk adverse than poorer people, so they 
require a smaller payment. In the other hand IARA implies that richer people require a larger 
payment than poorer people in order to enter in a lottery game. Naturally, the DARA case is 
more realistic than the IARA case. 
 
                                                          
6  One can also express the utility function in terms of wealth (W) instead of consumption (C) without 
loss of generality. 
7  The coefficient of relative risk-aversion (CRRA) is equal to    ttt cAccR   and it implies that risk-
aversion also depends upon the individual’s level of consumption, which in turn depends on his wealth.  
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In 1971, Merton proposed the Hyperbolic utility function with Absolute Risk-Aversion 
(HARA) that has two big advantages: it includes the previous specifications as particular cases 
and it includes a wider range of risk preference specifications. Furthermore a particular choice 
of function parameters can change the slope of the risk aversion coefficients (CARA and 
CRRA): 
  
 
















1
1
t
t
C
CU         (5) 
 
Where: 
 
0 ; 0


 t
C
; and 0tC  
 
 For instance, if 0  then absolute risk-aversion is decreasing, while if 0  then 
absolute risk-aversion is increasing. If   then the coefficient of relative risk-aversion will 
be equal to .  
 
 If  then 1  and the so called generalized power utility function appears: 
 
 















1
1
1
t
t
C
CU         (6) 
 
From this specification, one could obtain the negative exponential function, the 
logarithmic utility function and the quadratic utility function: 
 
If 0  and 0 , then the generalized power utility function (expression 6) 
converges to the negative exponential function given by expression 3 and it has an absolute 
risk-aversion coefficient equal to . 
 
If 1  then an affine transformation of expression 6 converges to the logarithmic 
utility function: 
 
  







1
tt CLnCU   Where: 0
1


tC       
 
 This specification has a decreasing absolute risk-aversion coefficient equal to
 

1
1


t
t
C
CA . If   then the relative risk-aversion coefficient is equal to 1. 
 
 If 1  then the affine transformation of expression 6 will converge to the quadratic 
utility function: 
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 
2
1
2
1






 tt CCU

Where: 0
1
 tC

        
 
 This specification has an increasing absolute risk-aversion coefficient equal to: 
tC

1
1
. 
 
Recently, some new utility functions have been put forward in the literature. For 
instance Saha (1993) introduced the expo-power (EP) utility function. The functional form is 
as follows: 
 
 

 tCt eCU

            
 
With the following restrictions: 1  and 0  
 
Given these restrictions, the absolute risk-aversion coefficient is equal to the following 
expression:  
t
t
t
C
C
CA

 

1
. As Meyer (2007) pointed out, this is a two parameter 
model because the constant “ ” does not enter the risk-aversion coefficient.  
 
The main advantage of the EP functional form over the HARA is that the EP form 
reduces to the CARA form with finite parameter values. Remember that in the HARA form 
(expression 6) one needs to assume that 0  in order to have the CARA form. Xie (2000) 
tried to improve also a functional form over the HARA function, so he proposed the Power 
Risk Aversion (PRA) functional form. The advantage of this new functional form over the 
HARA is that it remains well-defined over a longer range for parameter values (Meyer, 2007): 
  
 
































1
1
exp1
1
1
t
t
c
CU  With the following restrictions: 0  and 0  
  
In the previous expression the exponential operator (exp) refers to the transcendental 
number “e”. The absolute risk-aversion coefficient is given by the following expression: 
 
    t
t
t C
C
CA   
 
Finally, Connife (2006) has provided the Flexible Three Parameter (FTP) functional 
form that encompasses the EP and PRA forms. The functional form is given by the following 
expression: 
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1




 When k=0 it reduces to the PRA (Meyer, 2007) 
 
 The absolute risk aversion coefficient is given by the following expression: 
 
 
 













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





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1
1
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t
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t
C
k
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C
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Despite the fact that using an HARA utility function just captures a more restrictive 
range of investors’ preferences than the alternatives utility functiuons (EP, PRA and FTP 
forms), it is the most used closed-form specification in financial economics. For instance, the 
HARA utility functions have been applied for estimating discount rates in the case of 
bankruptcy (Barthelemy et. al., 2006), for portfolio performance (Breuer and Gürtler, 2006), 
for portfolio allocation with hedge funds (Popova, 2006), and for expanding conditions for 
pricing in incomplete markets (Menoncin (1998), Luenberger (2002), and Guu and Wang 
(2008)). 
 
If one aims to capture other types of risk preferences, it would be better to follow the 
approach of Meyer (2007). The approach of Meyer is based upon defining a closed-form 
function for the marginal utility function instead of the utility function itself. This is because, 
the marginal utility also represents a risk preference, however not all persons have a closed-
form marginal utility. 
 
In this work, one believes that it is possible to use a broad (closed-form) utility function 
to estimate the lower bound of a discount rate and then, through a prospective risk-analysis, 
one may estimate the resulting expression’s parameters. In fact, Mongrut and Ramirez (2006) 
have shown that with incomplete markets there could be many discount rates so the possibilities 
to specify different values for the parameters are enormous. 
 
 
4. Discount rates for seed capital investments under incomplete markets 
 
In this section, one uses an affine transformation of expression 6 to solve the problem 
stated by Mongrut and Ramirez (2006): how much to consume today and tomorrow provided 
that each individual has an initial wealth and each one can invest in one investment project or 
make a deposit in a savings account. However, in order to put the problem more realistic, one 
analyses the case when the entrepreneur’s initial wealth level approaches to zero, when he is 
the entrepreneur with the lowest risk-aversion and invests all his money in the project. 
 
It is important to state beforehand that the solution this problem can be considered a 
generalized solution only the in the sense that it accounts for a broader set of risk preferences 
rather than the quadratic utility function used by Mongrut and Ramirez (2006). However, it 
should be clear by now that using expression 6 is only a subset of all possible risk preferences. 
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All the remaining assumptions made by Mongrut and Ramirez (2006) are also made in 
this derivation namely, it is an individual optimization meaning that each individual must 
define the parameters of the resulting discount rate expression according to his risk aversion 
and the specifics of the project. However, one can also define the lower bound of the discount 
rate with the entrepreneur with the lowest risk-aversion, which implies an absolute risk 
aversion coefficient equal to 1. 
 
One starts by optimizing the following two-period objective function (one also assumes 
that the utility function is time separable): 
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Subject to the following constraint:   
tt
t
t
CW
C
RE

 
1
1  
Where: 
 
  :1tRE  Represents the project expected return in period “t+1” 
tW :     The entrepreneur initial wealth level. 
tC :     The entrepreneur’s consumption of today 
1tC :     The entrepreneur’s consumption of tomorrow 
  
The stochastic discount factor (SDF) of the previous problem is equal to: 
 








 


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







 11 11
tt
t
CC
m        (7) 
 
 In order to estimate the parameters of the SDF for this individual, one may state the 
following system of equations (Mongrut and Ramirez, 2006): 
 
 
 1
11
1
1




tt
f
ttt
mE
R
RmE
 
 
 Using the SDF from equation 7, this system of equation translates into the following 
system: 
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 From equations 8 and 9, it follows the following condition: 
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Simplifying even more expression 11 it yields: 
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

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Expression 12 is very important because it allow us to derive the expressions of the 
discount rates for two risk preferences: quadratic and logarithmic. It is not possible to obtain 
the discount rate corresponding to the case of a negative exponential utility function because 
0  and 1. One must remember that the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is equal to . 
 
 
The case of a quadratic utility function appears when the following conditions are met: 1
, k = -1 and 0 . By replacing these conditions in equation 12 yields: 
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 Simplifying the previous expression yields: 
 
 
  






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


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ft
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CWR
RR
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1
1
1        (14) 
 
 Now, one must consider the following two conditions. The first condition is related to 
the entrepreneur with the lowest risk-aversion coefficient and the second condition refers to the 
low initial level of wealth of the entrepreneur 
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 Given these two conditions, equation 14 provides the lower bound for the discount rate 
for entrepreneurs with quadratic preferences: 
 
   tftt CVRTVRRE 







1
1
1

        (15) 
 
Where: 
 
 
 1
1

 
t
ftt
R
RRE
RTV

 is the reward-to-variability ratio and 
 
 
 1
1
1


 
tt
t
t
RE
R
CV

 is the coefficient of variation 
 
 However, for the entrepreneur with the lowest risk-aversion coefficient, one may 
assume that 1RTV , hence equation 15 boils down to: 
 
   11
1
1
 






 tftt CVRRE

        (16) 
 
 
 Note that in this case, the discount rate has three parameters: the risk-free rate (Rf), the 
coefficient that measure the magnitude of the entrepreneur risk-aversion (
1
1

 ) and the 
coefficient of variation that comes from the seed capital project. Besides, the absolute 
coefficient of risk-aversion is increasing because 0  and 1 . 
 
 Alternatively, one may study the case of the logarithmic risk preference. This situation 
appears when the following conditions are met: 1 , k = 1 and 0 . By replacing these 
conditions in equation 12 yields: 
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 Simplifying this expression taking into account the following property yields 
expression 18: 
 
     21122 1   ttttt RERRE   
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 Again in expression 18 one needs to consider the aforementioned two additional 
restrictions: 
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 Replacing these two restrictions in equation 18, yields the lower bound discount rate 
for an entrepreneur with a logarithmic risk preference: 
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 Note that in this case the discount rate has also three parameters: the risk-free rate (Rf), 
the risk-aversion “ ”, and the project’s total risk. However, the project total risk is being 
represented with two estimators: the standard deviation (and variance) of the project returns 
and the coefficient of variation of the project returns. This specification implies a decreasing 
risk-aversion coefficient and 10  . 
 
 
5. Properties of the discount rate expressions 
 
 In this section one identifies the critical parameters in both expressions for the lower 
bound of the discount rate (expressions 16 and 19) and then one performs a simulation analysis 
 
5.1 Analysis of the discount rate with quadratic preferences 
 
 Figure No 1 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis using the expression 16. As 
one may observe, the critical variable is the entrepreneur's risk-aversion coefficient and it has 
an asymmetric impact over the estimated discount rate because a decrease of 10% in the alpha 
parameter increases the project’s discount rate in more than 30%.. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
Figure No 1: Critical parameters for the estimation of discount rates with quadratic 
preferences 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 Figure No 2 shows the results of simulating discount rates assuming a constant risk-
free rate of 5%, a constant coefficient of variation equal to 0.15, and an alpha that is normally 
distributed with a mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 20%. The resulting discount rates tend 
to cluster around 20%. Although this is the lower bound, one may assume a different scenario 
and by getting different values for the parameters (especially for the coefficient of variation) 
 
Figure No 2: Simulated values for the discount rate with quadratic preferences 
 
 Tornado Graph for Discount rate/C6
Percent% Change in Discount rate/C6
0
1
2
3
-5.12-10.23-15.35-20.46-25.58-30.69 .00 5.12 10.23 15.35 20.46 25.58 30.69
 Risk free rate/C3 2.941%-2.941%
 Coefficient of variation / Coefficient of variation/C5 7.059%-7.059%
 Risk-aversion magnitude (alpha) / Risk-aversion magnitude (alpha)/C4 30.252%-16.29%
 Perc% Chg      
 in output at   
 end of bars     
 Distribution for Discount rate/D6
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
Values in 10^-2
0.000
0.066
0.133
0.199
0.265
0.332
13.52 21.79 30.06 38.34 46.61 54.88 63.15
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Source: Own elaboration  
  
5.2 Analysis of the discount rate with logarithmic preferences 
 
 Figure No 3 shows the critical variables for this type of discount rate. The main 
conclusion is that the alpha and the project total risk are crucial parameters to estimate the 
project’s discount rates. An increase of 10% in the risk aversion parameter alpha will decrease 
the project discount rate in 11%. It is interesting to note that although the alpha parameter is 
still important, its relative impact has been diminished. 
 
 Figure No 3: Critical parameters for the estimation of discount rates with 
logarithmic preferences 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
  Figure No 4 shows the simulation results for the discount rates with logarithmic 
preferences. Here, one uses a risk free rate of 5%, a coefficient of variation of 0.5, an alpha 
parameter that is normally distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 10%. 
Besides the project total risk is distributed according to a uniform distribution with a lower 
value of 0.2 and an upper value of 0.4. 
 
 From this analysis one may conclude that the joint effect of both critical variables tend 
to increase the simulated values of the discount rates. However, the net effect is still asymmetric 
and it is skewed to the right as it should be because they represent lower values.  
Figure No 4: Simulates values for the discount rate with logarithmic preferences 
 
 Tornado Graph for Discount rate/C14
Percent% Change in Discount rate/C14
0
1
2
3
4
-2.16-4.33-6.49-8.66-10.82-12.99 .00 2.16 4.33 6.49 8.66 10.82 12.99
 Risk free rate/C10 1.892%-1.892%
 Coefficient of variation / Coefficient of variation/C12 4.054%-3.041%
 Project total risk / Project total risk/C13 12.102%-11.107%
 Risk-aversion magnitude (alpha) / Risk-aversion magnitude (alpha)/C11 12.102%-11.107%
 Perc% Chg      
 in output at   
 end of bars     
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Source: Own elaboration 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this work one has obtained two expressions for estimating subjective discount rates 
using the HARA utility function. In this way, one has obtained more generalized results than 
those of Mongrut and Ramirez (2006). Furthermore, these two expressions have been obtained 
assuming an entrepreneur with the lowest risk-aversion coefficient, who almost lacks initial 
wealth, and who puts all his money in the investment opportunity (non-diversified 
entrepreneur). One believes that this entrepreneur’s profile is very common in emerging 
markets.   
 
The utility specification applied in this work only includes pecuniary returns (such as 
the project return on investment - ROI and total risk). Depending on the specification, total risk 
is measured using the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation. From the results, it 
seems that depending on the entrepreneur’s risk preferences, the risk-aversion parameter could 
be more or equally important as the measure of the project’s total risk.  
However, given the assumptions, it seems more realistic to use the logarithmic 
specification instead of the quadratic one because the former assumes DARA.  
 
 Given the importance of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion, it is important that future work 
is directed towards improve the measurement of it. At the end, what matters in the valuation of 
seed capital investments is consistency, not accuracy in the values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Distribution for Discount rate/G14
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
Values in 10^-2
0.000
0.036
0.071
0.107
0.142
0.178
8.91 18.33 27.76 37.19 46.62 56.05 65.48
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